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Abstract—A methodology is shown to analyze phases of 
player’s coalition formation. It can be applied to inter-regional 
cooperation analysis which is a relevant problem in Japan. 
Network formation game is used to model the problem with some 
extensions on a concept of coalition and coalition formative 
condition. A coalition among more than 3 players is introduced, 
which is not considered in standard network formation game. A 
coalition formative condition is also introduced taking into 
account specific characteristics about infrastructure construction. 
The methodology is applied to oil allocation problem among 
Caspian coastal countries, and how the methodology works in the 
real problem is examined. As a result, it is revealed that 
considering the coalition among more than 3 players is not sure 
to produce more social surplus than considering only the 
coalition between 2 players. 
Keywords— Network game, the Caspian Negotiaon, Coalition, 
Allocation, Network Infrastructure Planning
I. INTRODUCTION
If there is an ongoing negotiation, what can scientists do for 
stakeholders to support their decision achieving a better 
solution for each of them? GMCR (Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution [1]) is one of tools to support players’ making 
decisions, which is based on non-cooperative game theory. In 
one hand, negotiation can be thought as a broader concept than 
conflict management because negotiation does not matter 
whether there exists a conflict between stakeholders or not. On 
the other hand, negotiation can be said as a narrower concept 
than conflict management because negotiation presumes a 
contact between stakeholders while non-cooperative game 
theory can deal with pre-negotiation situation where 
stakeholders are going to make a decision on whether they will 
communicate with other stakeholders or not. 
Theoretical approach like game theory is sure to be a 
powerful tool for stakeholders in negotiation and/or conflict to 
help them understand clearly their situation. However, if it 
provides more than single equilibrium, in other words, if there 
exist several equilibria which lie in Pareto optimum, it does not 
give stakeholders any instructions for managing the conflict. 
That is, showing a structure of a conflict does not necessarily 
mean shrinking complexity, but it just does showing how 
complex the system is. Since a role of a system is to shrink 
complexity referring to Luhmann ([2]), fields of negotiation 
and/or conflict management should be elaborated more 
scientifically and provide theoretical framework to achieve 
shrinking complexity for stakeholders facing with negotiation 
and/or a conflict. In other words, fields of negotiation and/or 
conflict management are now required to be a system for 
supporting stakeholders’ decision-making. 
In this paper, to contribute to this purpose, network game is 
transformed to apply a real case. Although network game 
incorporates both concepts of non-cooperative game theory and 
cooperative game theory, this paper focuses on non-cooperative 
game aspect. We show how our set of models works to shrink 
complexity of the real ongoing negotiation in the Caspian 
problem. 
Participatory decision-making should be taken in 
negotiation and/or conflict management process where other 
individuals except players, neither of facilitator or scientists 
involved as advisors, cannot induce players to a certain goal if 
there are more than single equilibrium which are Pareto 
relationship, and this is the usual case. In this case, roles of 
scientists will be to reveal issues and strategies which are 
strongly dominated by other issues and strategies. This will be 
a help for stakeholders because it shrinks complexity, and this 
is what this paper aims at. 
II. NETWORK GAME AND ITS EXTENSION
A. Network Game[3]
Network game aims to give strategic foundations to 
network formation. Coalitions are groups of players whose 
members decide to cooperate, possibly by establishing binding 
agreements. Networks are described by bilateral links between 
decision makers (nodes or players). In a cooperative game, 
since coalitions are sets of players, how players are connected 
does not matter. Therefore, network game can express more 
variety of coalitions. The precise structure of the links 
connecting a coalition may influence the payoffs to its 
members. 
N = {1, 2,…, n} is a set of players of individuals connected 
in some network relationship. These players will be the nodes 
or vertices in a graph that will describe the network 
relationships. Each player has discretion in forming his or her 
links in the network relationship. These may be people 
deciding on whom they wish to contract with. Two players are 
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either related to each other or not, but it cannot be that one is 
related to the second without the second being related to the 
first. Joint consent is needed to establish and maintain the link.  
A network g is a list of which pairs of players are linked to 
each other. A network is then a list of unordered pairs of 
players {i, j}. For any pairs of players i and j, {i, j} ∈ g
indicates that i and j are linked under the network g. For 
simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i, j}, and so ij∈ g
indicates that i and j are linked under the network g. For 
instance, if N = {1, 2, 3}, then g = {12, 23} is the network in 
which there is a link between players 1 and 3. 
Let be gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2, G = 
{g ⊂ gN} denotes the set of all possible networks of graphs on N.
The network gN is referred to as the “complete” network. 
A shorthand notation for the network obtained by adding 
link ij to an existing network g is g + ij, and for the network 
obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g is g - ij.
A network game is a pair (N, v), where N is the set of 
players and v is a value function on networks among those 
players. 
Jackson and Wolinsky ([4]) defines pairwise stable to 
model network formation by dispensing with the specifics of a 
non-cooperative game and simply model a notion of what a 
stable network is directly. 
Pairwise stability: A network g is pairwise stable with 
respect to allocation rule π  and value function v if  
(i) for all ij g∈ ,
( ) ( ), ,i ig v g ij vπ π≥ −  and ( ) ( )vijgvg jj ,, −≥ ππ , and 
(ii) for all gij ∉ ,
if ( ) ( )vijgvg ii ,, +< ππ , then ( ) ( )vijgvg jj ,, +> ππ .
The first part of the definition of pairwise stability requires 
that no player wish to delete a link that he or she is involved in. 
Implicitly, any player has the discretion to unilaterally 
terminate relationships in which he or she is involved. The 
second part of the definition requires that if some link is not in 
the network and one of the involved players would benefit from 
adding it, then it must be that the other player would suffer 
from the addition of the link. Here, it is implicit that the 
consent of both players is needed for adding a link. 
Although pairwise stability is natural and quite easy to 
work with, it is a so week notion that it can consider deviations 
by at most a pair of players at a time. Pairwise stability might 
be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient requirement for a 
network to stable over time. 
Alternative to pair wise stability that allow for larger 
collations than just pairs of players to deviate were first 
considered by Dutta and Mutuswami([5]). The following 
definition is in that spirit and is due to Jackson and van den 
Nouweland([6]). 
A network is obtained from g G′∈  via g G∈ deviation by S
if 
(i) ij g′∈ and ij g∉ implies ij S⊂ , and 
(ii) ij g∈ and ij g′∉ implies ij S∩ ≠ ∅ .
This definition identifies changes in a network that can be 
made by a coalition S without the consent of any players 
outside of S. Part (i) requires that any new links that are added 
can only be between players in S. This requirement arises 
because the consent of both players is needed to add a link. Part 
(ii) requires that at least one player of any deleted link be in S.
This is because either player in a link can unilaterally sever the 
relationship. 
Strong stability: A network is strongly stable with respect to 
allocation rule π  and value function v if for any ,S N g′⊂  that 
is obtained from g via deviations by S, and i S∈  such that  
( ) ( ), ,i ig v g vπ π′ > ,
there exists j S∈ such that  
( ) ( ), ,j jg v g vπ π′ < .
Strong stability provides a powerful refinement of pairwise 
stability. It mainly makes sense in smaller network situations in 
which players have substantially information about the overall 
structure and potential payoffs and can coordinate their actions. 
As strong stability is a very demanding concept, what appears 
to be an improving deviation might not be taken if one started 
to forecast how the other players might react. Nevertheless, 
when strongly stable networks exist, they have very nice 
properties. 
B. Extention of Network Game and Strategies for Coallition 
In network game, multilateral coalition is assumed as a pile 
of bilateral coalition while it is assumed just as a set of players 
in cooperative game theory. These are thought to be 
complementary properties of coalition. Therefore, in this paper, 
the concept of coalition in cooperative game theory is 
introduced to network game framework as an extension, which 
we will call partial grand coalition in this paper. 
Players in partial grand coalition are assumed to maximize 
their aggregate benefit, and network is decided by players in 
the partial grand coalition to fulfill their maximization. Since, 
in this paper, coalition is regarding whether a network 
infrastructure is constructed or not between particular pairs of 
players, the partial grand coalition will decided a infrastructure 
network where there does not necessarily exist a infrastructure 
between certain pairs of players in the coalition. 
Now, terms seem to be so complicated that a summary of 
the terms is shown in Table 1. Fig.2 will be also a help to 
understand the relationship. In a bilateral coalition case, a link 
has two meanings at the same time. That is, if there is a link 
between a certain pair of players, they have made a coalition 
between them, and eventually they have constructed an 
infrastructure between them. In partial grand coalition case, a 
link has an only meaning that there exists an infrastructure as a 
result of aggregate decision by the players in the partial grand 
coalition. As for a description about a coalition, coloring node 
is used for the case of partial grand coalition, which is shown in 
Fig.2. Example 1 shows that player 1, 2, 3 have made a partial  
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TABLE I. REALTIONSHIP OF TERMS
Graph 
Theory Interpretation of Components  
Description 
in graph Non-physical Relationship Physical Relationship 
link Coalition in Birateral Negotiation Single Infrastructure 
coloring node Coalition in Multirateral Negotiation -
graph Coalition Structure Network of Infrastructures 
Figure 1. Visual Explation of Terms 
grand coalition, and as a result of aggregate decision-making, 
links have been constructed between player 1 and 4, 3 and 4. 
Player 2 is not in any coalitions. Example 2 shows that player 1, 
2, 3 have made a partial grand coalition, and player 2 and 3 
have made a bilateral coalition. As a result of aggregate 
decision-making by player 1, 3, 4, infrastructures are 
constructed between player 1 and 4, 3 and 4. As for the 
bilateral coalition between 2 and 3, an infrastructure has been 
constructed between player 2 and 3. Therefore, a link has 
double meanings in the case of bilateral coalition. Graphs of 
example 1 and 2 give visual information about coalition 
structure and infrastructure network formations at the same 
time. 
C. Coalition Foramative Condition 
As explained in the section A of this chapter, pairwise 
stability or strong stability can be a coalition formative 
condition in network game. Based on real cases of 
infrastructure construction, we can establish another coalition 
formative condition. In the following, we assume that 
allocation rule π does not account initial cost but only running 
cost. 
Coalition formative condition for bilateral coalition: A 
network g+ij is formative with respect to allocation rule π  and 
value function v if for all ij g∈ , ( ) ( ), ,i ig ij v g vπ π+ >  and 
( ) ( ), ,j jg ij v g vπ π+ > .
Coalition formative condition for multilateral coalition: A 
network g’ where links and nodes are added to g is formative 
with respect to allocation rule π  and value function v if for all 
i g′∈ , ( ) ( ), ,i ig v g vπ π′ > .
These conditions consider irreversibility and initial cost of 
construction. Players cannot remove the infrastructure which 
they have constructed so that conditions do not mention 
anything about reduced graph g-ij. As for the initial cost of 
constructing a infrastructure, it is usually so huge amount of 
money that both of conditions do not contain equal signs 
because payoff should be lager in the graph g+ij or g’ than in 
graph g on the assumption of allocation rule π  which does not 
consider initial cost. 
III. THE CASPIAN PROBLEM
The framework of analysis discussed in the previous 
chapter is applied to on-going negotiation problem among 
littoral countries of the Caspian. Before showing details of 
model and analysis results, background of the problem is 
briefly explained. 
The Caspian is known as the largest lake in the world. 
Surface area is 371,000km², volume is 78,200km³, maximum 
depth is about 1,025 m, and salinity is approximately 1.2%. 
Seeing the salinity ratio, it can be thought as sea. However, 
there is no particular international law which can be applied to 
the Caspian. Technically, the definition of lake is that the water 
body is not connected to the open seas, and on the other hand, 
the definition of sea is that the water body is connected to the 
open seas. The Caspian is not naturally connected to any open 
seas, but it is artificially connected to Black Sea via Volga-Don 
canal. Therefore, international law of lake or sea cannot strictly 
apply to the Caspian. Before USSR was disintegrated, there 
were only two countries around the Caspian, namely USSR and 
Iran. They agreed on treating the Caspian as lake. In other 
words, the Caspian used to be divided into two parts between 
USSR and Iran based on the ordinal way of regulating lakes. 
However, after USSR was disintegrated, the situation 
changed. The littoral countries are now five; Russia, Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Depending on the 
regulation rule, the stakes of each country are so different that 
the littoral countries are claiming their own interests, and they 
have recently just started negotiating with each other in the 
dialog initiated by International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis in Austria. 
The Caspian problem is complicated because there are lots 
of issues to be agreed, which are related each other. Is 
comprehensive agreement better than piling up single-issue 
agreements? To answer the question, we need to understand the 
system of the Caspian problem at first. 
Agreement on oil allocation can be thought as a critical 
issue which lies on the basis of the comprehensive problem. 
Therefore, the attitude of players toward solving energy 
negotiation may decide the attitude toward solving other issues. 
However, energy issue has not been discussed well among five 
countries although some bilateral agreements have been 
concluded, and this can be thought as a reason why the Caspian 
negotiation seems to be prolonged. 
Now, we are going to model the oil conflict by the extended 
network game, and a certain portion of complexity will be 
reduced. This will be somehow a help of solving whole issues 
remaining. 
Players are set as Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and EU 
because Caspian oil is basically exported to EU so that the 
related stakeholders in oil trade involving EU are considered. 
In the context of oil allocation, the infrastructure means 
pipeline. Therefore, our main focuses in the following are on 
how to construct pipelines, how to allocate oil through the 
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pipeline network will evolve. We will consider all the 
possibilities of pipelines which are represented by all the 
combinations of two players unless the two cannot be 
connected directly because of certain topographical reasons. 
IV. OIL ALLOCATION MODEL
In this chapter, models for calculating payoffs are 
established. As notations, g is used as coalition structure and 
pipeline network for cases of bilateral approach while gs is 
used for cases of multilateral approach. 
A. Allocation by birateral collaiiton between 2 players in 
birateral coallition 
It is assumed that there exist pipelines between player 
( )Nii ∈  and player ( )j j i∉ , player i and player k
( ),k i k j∉ ∉ . Player k can produce oil, and it exports oil to 
player i. Player i can export oil to player j if it imports oil from 
player k and/or it produces oil by itself. Player i decides the 
amounts of its production, domestic supply and export to player 
j by maximizing its own profit. The situation is depicted in 
Fig.2. 
Player i’s oil is defined as sum of 1) domestic produced oil 
and 2) imported oil from other players except player j in the 
situation of Fig.2. In the case of 1), player i can produce oil by 
iX  with adjusting the amount to satisfy domestic demand at 
most maxiX during a certain period. If player cannot produce 
oil then 0iX = . In the case of 2), sum of imported oil to player 




kii YY  (1) 
Note that { }' , ,iN k k N k i k j= ∈ ≠ ≠ .
Player i’s oil can be represented by Xi+Yi. The oil exported 
to player j is defined by qij, and the oil supplied to its own 
country is defined by qi. Domestic oil price and demand of 
player i are represented by pi, zi respectively while domestic oil 
price and demand of player j are represented by pj, zj. Now we 
can describe the relationship of domestic oil price and demand 
as equations (2) and (3) which are inverse demand functions. 
( )iii zDp =  (2) 
( )jjj zDp =  (3) 
Considering the situation of Fig.2, the general description 
of inverse demand functions are redefined as equations (4) and 
(5). 
( )iii qDp =  (4) 
( )ijjij qDp =  (5) 
Transportation cost per unit from player i to player j is 
defined as cij, and production cost per unit of player i is defined 
as ci.
With the model settings, the problem to solve can be 
defined as equation (6) where player i decides the amount of  
Figure 2. Model of Birateral Collaiiton between 2 Players 
domestic production Xi, domestic supply qi and exported oil 
production Xi, domestic supply qi and exported oil to player j qij




































Note that { }kjijNjjNi ≠≠∈= ,, .
B. Allocation among more than 3 players in partial grand 
coallition 
The base model of deciding oil allocation among more than 
3 players is same as the model for 2 players in the previous 
section. However, in the model for 3 players, a certain player 
can export oil to another player in the coalition who is not 
directly connected but indirectly connected via a certain player 
in the partial grand collation. The objective of partial grand 
coalition is to maximize sum of profit of all the players in the 
coalition so that any pair of players can trade with each other 
with the pipelines which are shared by all the players in the 
coalition. Note that price of oil does not change if the oil only 
passes through the players who are not traded with. 










π  (7) 
where sum of profit of all the players in the partial grand 
coalition is maximized by constructing pipelines. In other 
words, the partial grand coalition defines a certain network gs
out of the remaining of "NGR  which is the set of partial graphs 
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V. ANALLYSIS OF CALLITION FROMATION PROCESS
A. Data and Details of Model Settings 
To analyze the Caspian energy negotiation problem with 
the models discussed, parameters of inverse demand function, 
transportation cost, production cost and the maximum amount 
of produced oil are needed to be set referring to data. 
At first, the inverse demand function Di is assumed as linear 
function which defines the relationship of domestic demand zi
barrel/day and price pi $/barrel. It can be described as in 
equation (8). 
iiii BzAp += ( iA , iB : constants) (8) 
Price elasticity ε  for the inverse demand function is 






⋅= 1ε (9) 
Once a pair of a certain price and demand and price 
elasticity are observed, the inverse function is obtained by 
solving the equations (8) and (9). 
As for the price elasticity ε , the estimated average value of 
price elasticity in long term to demand for gasoline in United 
States is used, namely -0.38 ([7]). The price is set as the 
average oil price in 2006 referring to the report of oil company 
BP ([8]). The demand is set using the same report with 
consideration on players’ energy situations. The demand of 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are set based on the report. Russian 
demand is set as weighted demand by population. That is, the 
imported oil to Russia from the Caspian is thought to be 
distributed only in south region where its population ration to 
whole population in Russia is 0.16 ([9]). Then, 0.16 is 
multiplied with total demand of oil in Russian, and this is used 
for Russian demand in this region. As for EU, the demand is set 
by multiplying total consumption and 0.27 which is import 
ration from Russia ([10]). 
By solving the equations (8) and (9) with the settings above, 
the estimated constants Ai and Bi and corresponding values of 
price and demand are obtained as Table 2. 
As for the transportation cost of oil, 4 $/barrel is used for 
any links based on the transportation cost of CPC pipeline 
reported by IDCJ ([11]). This is because the assumed players, 
namely Russia, EU, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, are situated 
closely so that there does not exist much difference in 
topography, geology and climate which may give the 
difference to the transportation cost. 
The same logic can be applied to the production cost of oil. 
Therefore, 7 $/barrel is used as all the players’ production cost, 
which is the production cost of Kazakhstan reported by 
Cambridge Economic Research Association. 
As for the maximum amount of oil production in a certain 
period, the produced amount in 2006 is used, which is reported  
TABLE II. ESTIMATED VALUES OF INVERSE DEMAND FUNCTION
Russia EU
 p ($/barrel) 65.14 65.14
 z (barrel/day) 437616.29 4318403.03
 A -0.000392 -0.000040
 B 236.58 236.58
Kazakhstan Azerbaijan
 p ($/barrel) 65.14 65.14
 z (barrel/day) 220743.01 96467.48
 A -0.000777 -0.001777
 B 236.58 236.58
by oil company BP in 2006. Therefore, 1.43×106 barrel/day is 
used for Kazakhstan and 0.65×106 barrel/day is used for 
Azerbaijan. Russia and EU do not have their own fields so that 
the maximum amounts of oil production for them are not set. 
B. The case of birateral approach 
Now, coalition formation process on the assumption that 
players consider only bilateral approach is analyzed. 
To evaluate coalition structures, sum of social surplus 
SC(g) is used, which is defined in equation (10). 
( ) ( )
( )






i gCSggSCgSC π  (10) 
 SCi(g): Social surplus of player i in the coalition structure g
( )giπ : Profit of player i in the coalition g
 CSi(g): Domestic consumer surplus of player i in the 
coalition structure g
 N(g): The set of players in the coalition structure g
The coalition formation process can be obtained as Fig.3 
and some examples of coalition structure are depicted in Fig.4. 
In Fig.3, x-axis shows the number of constructed pipelines, and 
y-axis shows sum of social surplus calculated by equation (10). 
Figure 3. Coaltion Formation Process in the case of Birateral Approach 
The number of pipelines
Sum
 of Social Surplus ($) 
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Figure 4. Examples of Coalition Structures 
In Fig.4, R, K, A, and E represent Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, and EU respectively. As seen in Fig. 4, in the case 
that players negotiate only bilaterally, g28 and g32 are obtained 
as stable coalition structures which do not have any transferable 
coalition structures. Comparing these two coalition structures, 
g32 requires one more additional pipeline than g28 to achieve 
the same level of social surplus. Installing cost of pipelines is 
huge and it will obviously pollute environments so that g28 is 
desirable from a view point of social norm. However, it can be 
observed in Fig. 3, there exists path dependency, and as the 
earliest example, if players decide to choose the situation of g9,
they can never reach g32 afterwards. 
C. The case of multirateral approach 
Finally, the coalition formation process in the case of 
multilateral approach is analyzed. The assumption is that that 
players consider both of bilateral coalition and partial grand 
coalition as their strategies. Corresponding to this assumption, 
SC(g) in the equation (10) is redefined SC(g) or SC(gs) where g
represents the bilateral approach, and gs represents the 
multilateral approach which considers both of bilateral 
coalition and grand partial coalition. The analysis result is 
shown in Fig.5 
Seeing Fig.5, there exist some multilateral approach paths 
which provide more profit than bilateral approach paths do. 
Furthermore, gs12 and gs21 which provide the highest profit 
can be reached with quite a few steps. In our model, the 
negotiation cost is not considered, but once seeing the result of 
Fig.5, gs12 and gs21 have a good property regarding the 
negation cost as well as the high level of social surplus. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the methodology to analyze the coalition 
formation process regarding construction of network 
infrastructure is proposed. The framework of network game is 
applied with some extensions on the concept of coalition and 
coalition formative conditions. 
As a result, the coalition formation processes for the Caspian 
oil negotiation are obtained for the two cases; one is the case 
where players consider only bilateral approach, and another is 
the case where players consider both of bilateral coalition and 
partial grand coalition which we call multilateral approach. 
Usually, it is thought that aggregate decision-making is better 
than piles of bilateral approach but it is not necessarily true as 
we can see in Fig.5. 
Figure 5. Coaltion Formation Process in the case of Birateral Approach 
The information is not usually symmetry among players. It 
is needless to say that the information is also asymmetry 
between players and scientist or coordinators who are third 
parities. Therefore, an important role of scientists and 
coordinators is not to point out the resolution but to shrink 
complexity for players to make a decision by themselves. In 
addition to this, it is a ideal situation if the instruction provided 
by scientist and coordinators motivates players to share more 
information among them. The models shown in this paper may 
contribute somehow to this purpose. 
The cost allocation model and considering equity in 
allocation are remaining tasks to be dealt with in near future. 
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